German photograph of Russian soldiers at Baranovitchi (Baranawitschy), 'slaughtered by stick grenade.' Baranovitchi was the site of Stavka, the Russian High Command, until August 8, 1915, when it was relocated to Mogilev in the face of the continued German-Austro-Hungarian Gorlice-Tarnow advance. Baranovitchi was also the site of Russia's July 1916 offensive, ostensibly coordinated with Brusilov's begun a month before, that lost 80,000 Russians between July 2 and 8, at a cost of 16,000 Germans. The stick grenade was introduced in 1915.
Reverse:After attack of the Russians at Baranawitschy in front of our trenches. Slaughtered by stickgrenades (translation by Thomas Faust, eBay's Urfaust)
". . . there was only marsh. There was no time to sap forward, no time for guns to register properly. A huge force of cavalry clogged the supply-lines. Twenty-one and a half infantry, five cavalry divisions were gathered. A thousand guns opened the bombardment, with a thousand rounds each. This was not effective. Two German divisions were brought in as reserves just before the attack began; the bombardment, though lasting for several days, achieved nothing in particular. A few initial tactical successes came—3,000 prisoners, a few guns. On 4th July one of the two Austrian divisions collapsed, and the line was held by reserve Germans. Then the attack stopped—resumed again with bombardment on the 7th July, and again stopped. By 8th July the Russians had lost 80,000 men, and the Germans 16,000. Yet this attack had used up more shell than the whole of Brusilov's front in the first week of his offensive."
In his offensive launched on June 4, 1916, Russian General Alexsei Brusilov had demonstrated the results that could be achieved with careful preparation and adequate weapons. Generals Alexei Evert and Alexander Ragoza, like their fellow commanders, did not learn Brusilov's lessons, such as that of digging trenches (saps) toward the enemy front line to minimize the open ground over which soldiers needed to advance to reach the enemy trench. Brusilov preceded his infantry assault with a bombardment of hours, not days. He did not rely on cavalry to exploit a breakthrough, but on well-coordinated artillery and infantry. Brusilov also had the advantages of facing primarily Austro-Hungarian troops rather than German, and of having more time to prepare. The Russians were unable to exploit Brusilov's success.
The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 by Norman Stone, pp. 260-261, copyright © 1975 Norman Stone, publisher: Charles Scribner's Sons, publication date: 1975
1916-07-08, 1916, July, Brusilov Offensive, Baranovitchi, Baranovitchi Offensive
